In Malaysia, when there is a major incident, some poor lowly employee is made the scapegoat and all blame is heaped on him. The bigger organisational failure, the cuts in funding, the shortcuts, the lack of maintenance, the corruption, the system failures and the supervisory staff, all escape censure.
Remember MH370? The sleeping air-traffic controller supervisor? Till now, we do NOT know if he was sacked or is he some Datuk’s son, and so escaped punishment?
Anyway, back to yesterday’s LRT crash.
First. The most reviled and loathed person in Malaysia (for now) has been sacked. Good!The racist and loud-mouthed Prasarana chairman should have been sacked much earlier.
The chairman of Prasarana Malaysia Berhad, Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, is anxious about receiving his second Coronavirus vaccination, as was seen in the press conference (PC) of 25 May, so it would be pointless to shower him with serious questions about yesterday’s LRT crash.
This probably factored in his staff’s thinking, because according to him, they did not immediately notify him about the accident, but delayed the information.
They are probably aware, that Tajuddin has more important matters on his mind, and as he admitted, he had to make various preparations for his Coronavirus vaccination the following day
(Tajuddin has narcissistic tendencies and his staff are probably glad that he has been kicked out. They probably wish it had happened earlier.)
He should be praised for his dedication to duty, by hosting this PC despite the prospect of the traumatic Coronvarius medical procedure.
Moreover, Tajuddin also made it clear that it would have been futile for him to visit the crash site, despite being the chairman of Prasarana, the company which owns and operates Malaysia’s urban rail network.
(Not just lazy but totally inept and incapable.)
He said that the Transport minister, Wee Ka Siong had already been to the site, as had the Prasarana chief executive Norila Noah. In other words, his presence would have been unnecessary.
(Tajuddin is the Ketuanan Melayu extraordinaire…he is too important to clamber into a tunnel to check on others. He is guided by his self-importance…he has this Me-Me-Me trait.)
One can understand Tajuddin’s anxiety for his own health, which showed in his engagement with reporters. He was incoherent, when asked specific questions. He tried to make jokes about the accident, was patronising, condescending, accusatory, defensive and showed his contempt when asked if he would resign. His “nerves” and erratic behaviour, are symptomatic of a condition called “White Coat Syndrome” (WCS).
Second. Minister Wee Ka Siong had better tread carefully. We are watching him.
Minister Wee said that preliminary investigations, by the Land Public Transport Agency, had showed that the driver of the empty train ‘TR40’ had been negligent. He said that the train should not have reversed, on a collision course with TR81, but should have moved south towards Dang Wangi station.
To blame the driver of TR40 is grossly unfair. Digital trains are computer controlled. Each train has its own in-built computer system. In the LRT incident, there appears to be a system failure of the highest order. The driver is not entirely to blame.
He also said that TR81 remained static at KLCC station, before it resumed and moved automatically towards Kampung Baru station, after it received a signal that TR40 had left.
TR40 may have left the station but it was on a collision course with TR81. Was the control centre unable to detect in which direction TR40 was heading? What happened to the warning and failsafe devices on each train?
Digital trains use the latest technology and the movement of each train is closely monitored by a computer. The train’s position is visible on a screen at control centre (headquarters).
So what happened to all the safety mechanisms? Something went seriously wrong, and to blame it solely on the driver would be irresponsible.
Modern railway and train signals have been revolutionised, since the olden days, when flag waving guards would signal to the driver that it was safe to proceed and the points were changed by a railwayman in a signal box.
Today, trains have their own highway code. The train line is divided into sections, or blocks, and only one train is allowed to move within each block.
Train signals are relayed by a small electrical current between the tracks and trains. Each pulse identifies the train’s position within the block. Axel counters count the rotations of the wheels.
The exact speed and position of each train is relayed to the control centre, where the central computer system can calculate how close to each other the trains can travel safely. This information is sent back to the train so that it can move accordingly. A train is only allowed to enter a section, if these computer calculations say it is safe.
If the line ahead is occupied, the train will reduce speed, and will not be allowed entry into that section.
The trains have an extra failsafe device which prevents trains from travelling in opposite directions, whilst on the same track. So what happened to this protective device yesterday? Was it disabled or overridden? Why and on whose instruction?
What happened to the technical experts at the control centre? They failed to observe what was going on in the tunnel beneath KLCC. Were they asleep on the job, like the air traffic controllers who lost contact with MH370?
The LRT incident suggests a combination of failures and not just negligence. Will the Cabinet dare to acknowledge these mistakes, and demand that heads roll?
So, was the crash due to human error, reduced funding for rail networks, or system and organisational failure, or all of the above?